
It is 02:40. You arrive on the scene of a car accident. Your patient is trapped, hypotensive, and combative. You carry the drugs, the airway kit, the blood, and the scalpel. You are trained in all of it. The receiving trauma centre is 40 minutes away by road.
The question is not can you. The question is should you, here, now.
That question is answered badly more often than we admit, and it is almost never answered badly because of a knowledge gap. It is answered badly because of a situational awareness failure. The clinician knows the procedure. What they lose is the picture around it.
Situational awareness is not “being alert”
Endsley’s classic model gives us three levels, and they map onto procedural decisions almost perfectly:
- Perception — what is in front of me? Physiology, scene, team, kit, clock, transport time, weather, hazards.
- Comprehension — what does it mean? What trajectory is this patient actually on?
- Projection — what happens next? What does this patient look like in ten minutes with the procedure, and what do they look like without it?
Level 3 is where invasive procedures are decided. It is also the level that collapses first under stress, task load, and noise. Under pressure we drop back to Level 1, we see the monitor, we see the wound, we reach for the kit, and the projection never happens.
The framework below exists for one reason: to force Level 3 thinking at the moment we are least likely to do it naturally.
Three filters, applied in order
Filter 1 — Indication: does the physiology demand this before definitive care?
Note the wording. The question is not “is this procedure indicated for this condition.” It is “is it indicated in this phase of care.”
Sort your indications into two buckets:
- Time-critical — the patient deteriorates or dies before arrival without it. Tension pneumothorax. Obstructed or unprotectable airway. Catastrophic external haemorrhage. A pulseless, grossly deformed limb.
- Deferrable — the receiving team will do it faster, cleaner, and with imaging, lighting, and backup. Central access. Definitive fracture management. Most diagnostics.
Only time-critical indications survive this filter. Everything else stops here, no matter how comfortable you are performing it.
Filter 2 — Opportunity: is there a window where this displaces nothing more important?
This is the most under-used axis in prehospital decision making, and the one where good services differentiate themselves.
Transport time is the master variable. A six-minute run to a trauma centre removes the indication for nearly every on-scene procedure. A sixty-minute rural, mountain, or offshore evacuation restores it. The same patient, the same physiology, two entirely different correct answers. If your protocol doesn’t bend to transport time, your protocol is not a decision aid, it’s a habit.
Forced time is free time. Entrapment, prolonged extrication, waiting on the aircraft, these create windows that would otherwise be wasted. This is when you do the thing you would never stop for.
Default phase rule: on scene, do only what cannot be done moving. Push everything else into the transport phase.
But watch for reverse-window environments. In the back of a small aircraft, a cramped ambulance, or a winch operation, some procedures become impossible once you are moving. There, the opportunity is before departure, not en route. This inverts the default rule, and the inversion has to be recognised out loud — it is a classic source of “we’ll do it on the way” decisions that quietly become “we never did it.”
Filter 3 — Feasibility: can this be done well, here, by this team?
Estimate first-pass success in these conditions, not in the resus room where you last did it.
The honest inputs:
- Operator currency, not certification. When did you last actually do this?
- Number of trained hands available.
- Physical access to the head, chest, or limb.
- Light, noise, space, temperature, weather, contamination.
- And the one people skip: can this team manage the complication this procedure creates?
A procedure performed badly is usually worse than a procedure not performed at all. That sentence is worth putting on a wall.
The fourth filter nobody writes down
You can satisfy indication, opportunity, and feasibility and still be wrong, if failure is unrecoverable.
A failed intraosseous costs you thirty seconds and a needle. A failed RSI in a patient who was, until that moment, ventilating adequately can cost you the patient.
Weight your feasibility threshold against the downside, not the upside. High-consequence-of-failure procedures need a much higher bar than their success rates alone would suggest.
And one more thing that is always true: opportunity cost is never zero. Time spent is transport delayed, monitoring degraded, and the team leader’s attention consumed. Every procedure must buy back more time-critical physiology than it costs.
The framework applied
| Procedure | Verdict | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Finger thoracostomy | Usually yes | Immediate indication, seconds to perform, low feasibility bar |
| Tourniquet / pelvic binder | Usually yes | Fast, high yield, very hard to do badly |
| Blood or plasma | Yes, but en route | Indication is now; opportunity is the transport phase. Don’t stop for it |
| Prehospital RSI | Case by case | Indication must be strong, feasibility bar high, failure unrecoverable |
| Front of neck access (FONA) | Yes. the moment CICO is declared | All three filters resolve instantly: indication is absolute, opportunity is zero-later, feasibility is adequate anywhere. The only real failure mode is delay |
| Resuscitative thoracotomy | Narrow, but now | Tight indication and high feasibility bar — yet there is zero later opportunity |
| Central access, definitive splinting | Usually no | Fails the indication filter — deferrable to hospital |
Note how differently the same three filters weight each row. Thoracostomy passes on speed. Thoracotomy passes on the total absence of a later window. RSI is genuinely contested because the fourth filter, consequence of failure, dominates it.
FONA is the instructive outlier. It is the one row where every filter aligns and the framework has almost nothing to weigh, indication is absolute, there is no later window, and the technical bar is low enough to be met on a roadside with a scalpel and a bougie. And yet it is the procedure most often performed too late. That tells you something important: the framework’s job is not only to stop unnecessary procedures, but to remove hesitation from necessary ones. In a can’t-intubate-can’t-oxygenate situation, the decision has already been made by the physiology; the clinician’s only remaining task is to notice that, say it out loud, and cut. Services that drill the declaration — “this is a CICO, I am doing a FONA” — consistently do it faster than services that drill only the technique.
The cognitive traps, and what to do about them

The failure modes are predictable, which means they are defensible:
- Procedural momentum — “I’ve started, so I’ll finish.”
- Task fixation — the operator’s world shrinks to a 10cm square, and whole-scene awareness goes with it.
- Capability bias — “we carry it, so we should use it.” Kit generates its own indications if you let it.
- Skill-decay overconfidence — the gap between what you are credentialed to do and what you are currently good at.
Countermeasures that actually work in the field

A verbalised stop moment. Before any invasive procedure, say out loud: the indication, the window, and who is doing it. Thirty seconds. Its purpose is not permission — it is a shared mental model, and it gives the quietest person on the team a legitimate moment to say “wait.”
Pre-committed limits. Two attempts, then plan B. Decided before you start, never during. Limits set mid-procedure are not limits; they are negotiations you will lose.
A declared exit strategy before the first attempt. If this fails, we do this. Named, agreed, understood by everyone.
Time called aloud by someone not performing the procedure. “Eight minutes on scene.” Neutral, non-accusatory, relentless.
The team leader keeps their hands free during high-risk procedures. Someone must retain the global picture, and it cannot be the person with a laryngoscope in their hand.
The principle underneath all of it
On scene, you are not treating the disease You are buying the patient safe passage to somewhere the disease can be treated.
Every invasive procedure has to justify itself against that sentence. If it doesn’t buy passage, it costs it.







































When “no difference” isn’t the same as “doesn’t work”: reading REBOARREST trial carefully
12 JulA critical review of the first randomised trial of prehospital REBOA in non-traumatic out-of-hospital cardiac arrest.
Mario Rugna
A technique JUST for TRAUMA
REBOA was not designed for cardiac arrest. It grew out of trauma care, as a way to buy time in patients bleeding to death from injuries no tourniquet can reach non-compressible torso haemorrhage. The idea is mechanical and direct: thread a balloon catheter up the femoral artery, inflate it in the aorta, and physically dam the flow above the bleeding source. Occlude in Zone 1 (the descending thoracic aorta) or Zone 3 (below the renal arteries) depending on where the haemorrhage sits, and you both slow the exsanguination and prop up the pressure reaching the heart and brain.
That is the world REBOA has lived in for most of its history. The case series, the registries, the device approvals all sit within traumatic haemorrhage and traumatic cardiac arrest. In that setting the balloon does two jobs at once: it controls bleeding and augments proximal perfusion pressure.
REBOARREST is different! That’s WHY
Non-traumatic cardiac arrest is a fundamentally different problem, and that is what makes REBOARREST unusual. The patient isn’t bleeding; the heart has simply stopped. Occluding the thoracic aorta during chest compressions redistributes the little flow that CPR generates toward the coronary and cerebral circulations, raising coronary perfusion pressure in the way adrenaline is meant to. It is REBOA repurposed as “mechanical adrenaline,” stripped of the haemorrhage-control rationale that justified it everywhere else.
Until now, that idea rested almost entirely on physiological reasoning, animal data, case reports and small uncontrolled series. REBOARREST is the first randomised controlled trial to test it the first time REBOA has been asked, under proper experimental conditions, to prove itself outside of bleeding. That context is worth holding onto while reading what follows: a technique borrowed from one domain and applied to another carries its assumptions with it, and not all of them travel.
So WHAT!
The headline from REBOARREST is easy to summarise and easy to misread. Among 179 patients with non-traumatic out-of-hospital cardiac arrest (OHCA), adding resuscitative endovascular balloon occlusion of the aorta (REBOA) to advanced life support did not improve sustained ROSC: 28% in the intervention arm versus 26% in controls, an adjusted risk difference of 1.8% (95% CI −11 to 15, p=0.78). The graphical abstract states it plainly the strategy “did not significantly improve rates of sustained ROSC.”
A busy clinician skimming the abstract will file REBOA-for-OHCA under “tried, didn’t work.” The trial itself doesn’t support that conclusion, and the gap between what was found and what it means is the most interesting thing about this paper.
This is, first and foremost, a genuine achievement. It is the first RCT of REBOA in non-traumatic OHCA, run pragmatically across 12 sites in three countries, with concealed allocation, a blinded statistician, a prespecified analysis plan, an active data monitoring committee, and independent review of ALS quality. Those are not small things in prehospital research, where trials of this kind barely exist. But it’s worth being clear about what it can and cannot tell us.
The trial was built to detect an effect almost no intervention produces (not only in cardiac arrest)
REBOARREST was powered to detect a doubling of sustained ROSC from a baseline of 18% to 36%. The authors, to their credit, call this goal “optimistic.” It is more than that: powering a trial for a doubling means designing it to be blind to anything smaller. And in cardiac arrest, an absolute increase of even 5–10% in ROSC would be clinically meaningful and worth chasing.
This is the difference between absence of evidence and evidence of absence, and it matters. A non-significant p-value in an underpowered trial tells you the study couldn’t see an effect, not that no effect exists. REBOARREST cannot distinguish “REBOA doesn’t help” from “REBOA helps by a real but sub-doubling amount that this trial was never equipped to detect.”
Most of the intervention arm patients never got the intervention
The second structural issue compounds the first. Of 88 patients randomised to REBOA, only 51 (58%) actually underwent aortic occlusion. The rest didn’t: 19% achieved ROSC before the balloon could be inflated, 16% had an unsuccessful procedure, and 7% were aborted.
The primary intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis therefore compares a group in which four out of ten patients never received the treatment against a control group. This is a defensible and honest way to answer a strategy question “should an EMS system deploy REBOA in OHCA?” but it is not a clean test of whether aortic occlusion works physiologically. Dilution of this magnitude pushes the result mechanically toward the null before biology gets a say.
That’s why the as-treated (AT) signal deserves a mention, with heavy caveats. When patients who actually received occlusion were compared with controls, the first AT sensitivity analysis showed a significant benefit: a 16% absolute increase in sustained ROSC (95% CI 2 to 29, p=0.02). Read alone, that looks like the intervention doing exactly what it was supposed to. But this analysis conditions on a post randomisation event (whether the balloon went in and trims controls who died or achieved ROSC early) wide open to selection and time bias. It cannot confirm efficacy. What it can do is tell us ITT analysis is that the null result is hiding a signal worth taking seriously, not closing the book.
By the time the balloon inflated, the physiology may already have been lost
The rationale for REBOA in arrest is time critical: occlude the aorta, raise proximal and coronary perfusion pressure, mimic the haemodynamic effect of adrenaline, and buy a shot at ROSC. That logic depends entirely on getting there early.
In REBOARREST, the median interval from arrest to occlusion was 47 minutes. The authors name this “the major limitation,” and they’re right. By three-quarters of an hour, most of these patients were in prolonged, poor prognosis arrest, and the window in which augmented perfusion pressure might have mattered had largely closed. The trial reflects a mixed urban rural, largely helicopter dispatched system where reaching the patient takes time so what it really tested was late prehospital REBOA. Whether early occlusion (a metropolitan short-transport service, or an in-hospital arrest) would behave differently is a question this trial leaves wide open.
The one number that would explain the result was never recorded
Here is the quiet problem at the centre of the paper. The entire hypothesis rests on REBOA raising aortic and coronary perfusion pressure, and blood pressure was never measured. The Prytime catheter used in Italy lacked the equipment; the Reboa Medical catheter used elsewhere couldn’t measure pressure without exceeding its CE approval. Intra-aortic pressure data simply don’t exist.
So when the primary outcome comes back null, we can’t tell which of three very different stories is true: the balloon failed to raise coronary perfusion pressure, or it raised pressure but too late, or it raised pressure and ROSC still didn’t follow. EtCO₂ did rise significantly after occlusion but that was measured only within the occlusion subgroup, with no contemporaneous control comparison, so it’s a within group observation consistent with the mechanism rather than between group proof of it.
The endpoint that moved isn’t the endpoint that matters
Sustained ROSC ≥20 minutes is a surrogate. What patients and families care about is survival with an intact brain, and on those measures the arms were flat and consistent: 30-day survival was 7% in both groups, and good neurological outcome (mRS 0–3) was 6% versus 3%, not significant.
Even if the ROSC trend had been real, it didn’t carry through to survival or neurology. But the mirror image is also true: a trial powered on ROSC is hopelessly underpowered for these harder outcomes, so it can’t rule a survival difference in or out either.
So what does REBOARREST actually tell us?
On feasibility and safety, the trial is convincing. A two-person prehospital team can perform this procedure with a short procedure time (median 14 minutes from randomisation to occlusion), acceptable cannulation success, and no excess of adverse events. That’s a real, well-supported result, and it opens the door to other endovascular interventions in the field.
On efficacy, the honest verdict is: unproven, not disproven. What REBOARREST demonstrates is that a strategy of late prehospital REBOA, in a mixed urbanrural, expert-staffed, ECPR adjacent system, did not improve a surrogate outcome in a trial that could only ever have detected a very large effect, that never delivered the intervention to 42% of the treatment arm, and that never measured the pressure it was built around.
That is not “REBOA doesn’t work in cardiac arrest.” It’s “we still don’t know, and here’s exactly why we don’t.” The right response to this trial isn’t to abandon the question. It’s to design the study REBOARREST couldn’t be: earlier occlusion, invasive pressure monitoring, a realistic effect size, and enough events to see it. The as treated signal is reason enough to build it.
Reference: Brede et al. Prehospital resuscitative endovascular balloon occlusion of the aorta in non-traumatic out-of-hospital cardiac arrest (REBOARREST): an international, multicentre, open label, pragmatic, randomised, controlled trial. Critical Care 2026;30:324.
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Tags: cardiac arrest, emergency medicine, Out of Hospital Cardiac Arrest, prehospital emergency medicine, REBOA